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Judicial Independence, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and

Accountability in Guatemala

Jeffrey Davis and Edward H. Warner1
Department of Political Science
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
1000 Hilltop Circle
Baltimore, Maryland 21250
410.455.2181
davisj@umbc.edu

Abstract
In this paper, we examine the role of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in its efforts to impose accountability for human rights violations in
Latin America. We suggest that because domestic enforcement
mechanisms are irreconcilably deficient in this task, accountability must
emanate from beyond the state. We test this contention by examining one
of the most challenging nations in the region – Guatemala.
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1.

Introduction
Guatemalan security forces killed an estimated 200,000 people during that

country‟s 30-year internal conflict. Most of those responsible for these crimes remain
hidden behind a stubborn wall of impunity. In one episode, on July 18, 1982,
Guatemalan military and para-military personnel slaughtered 268 civilians. The
massacre took place in Plan de Sanchez and surrounding communities where “soldiers
randomly picked their victims, raping and torturing young women before rounding up
villagers in a house, throwing in hand grenades and firing machines guns.”1 Most of the
268 victims were Mayan. For more than 20 years Guatemala blocked all attempts to
punish those responsible for this massacre.
As nations work to democratize and liberalize after periods of intense conflict,
how can they confront this history of brutal human rights atrocities? How can their
recurrence be prevented? While traditional Anglo-American democratic theory suggests
that an independent judiciary is the institution ideally suited to hold the government
accountable to the law, in this essay we will consider whether international courts are
necessary to help post-conflict nations confront their past and democratize. By looking at
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), we examine whether international
courts can effectively promote human rights accountability and protection, and if so to
what extent. Human rights scholarship is perhaps at its most revealing when the analysis
is coupled with the human story from which the legal and political issues arise.
Therefore, our analysis will orbit around the case studies of the Mack, Carpio and Plan
de Sanchez trials from Guatemala.2 Guatemala is an ideal subject of analysis for this
essay because it is emerging from 30 years of political violence. It has suffered some of
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the most horrific human rights violations in the region and it is now struggling to
reconcile this past and embrace liberal democracy. It has one of the worst human rights
records in Latin America according to observers like Amnesty International and the U.S.
State Department, and thus it is a monumentally challenging case.3
To uncover answers to our questions we first provide a brief history of Guatemala.
We then consider the role of courts in the struggle for human rights, demonstrating the
need for international judicial action. Accompanying this section, we include a
discussion of the purpose of international courts. Then after a brief introduction to the
Inter-American human rights system and our three case studies, we examine whether and
how the IACHR accomplishes the purpose of an international human rights tribunal.
Finally, drawing on lessons from the analysis, we conclude that international courts, and
specifically the Inter-American Court, can indeed promote human rights. We base
analysis on interviews with lawyers and activists working in the area, on our observation
of proceedings before the IACHR, and on the content analysis of IACHR decisions.4

2.

Historical Background
Guatemala has a deeply tragic history of political violence and wide spread

human rights violations with causes traceable to its colonial roots. In an effort to break
with years of the repression, stratification and exploitation of the colonial and postcolonial regimes, Guatemala elected populists presidents in the two elections following
World War II. Dr. Juan José Arévalo and his successor Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman
embraced land reform and encouraged broader political participation. However, in 1954,
when President Arbenz‟s reform efforts were perceived as harming U.S. interests, the
Central Intelligence Agency helped Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas overthrow Arbenz. In
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order to consolidate power and reverse the political opening of the Arévalo and Arbenz
regimes, the Armas government strengthened the state security apparatus extending it to
the rural areas. For more than 40 years this security apparatus has been brutally
repressing opposition in whatever form it appeared – supporters of land reform, the labor
movement and the rural insurgency. In 1978 when General Romeo Lucas Garcia became
president he first targeted political opposition in the urban centers and later the labor
movement and insurgency in the countryside. Then after taking power in a coup in 1982
General Efrain Rios Montt launched a bloody scorched earth anti-insurgency campaign.
Most of the male peasants were conscripted into civil patrols and tens of thousands of
innocent Guatemalans and combatants were killed.5
In 1983 General Oscar Mejia Victores overthrew Rios Montt and began a
painstakingly slow process of democratization. However, this promising step did not
coincide with the cessation of violence as the military continued its bloody antiinsurgency campaign. Despite a relatively successful democratic power transition in
1986 the civilian governments were unable to wrest meaningful authority from the
military.6
Serrano Elias was elected president of Guatemala in 1990 defeating the National
Center Party led by Jorge Carpio Nicolle. However, Serrano‟s legislative coalition
dissolved in 1993 causing him to lose control of his legislative agenda. On May 25, 1993,
Serrano executed a “self-coup” in which he dismissed congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Court and the Procurator of Human Rights. He suspended fundamental
liberties and took control of radio and television broadcasting.7 On June 1, 1993, the
Guatemalan Constitutional Court declared Serrano‟s administration illegal and Serrano
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fled to El Salvador amidst rising opposition. Five days later the Congress appointed the
Procurator of Human Rights, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, Jorge Carpio Nicolle‟s cousin,
President of Guatemala.8 Serrano‟s failed coup signaled the first albeit small step away
from military dominance. President Alvaro Arzú was elected president in 1996 and the
Guatemalan Peace Accords were signed that year.
Even with the Peace Accords and the transition to democratically elected civilian
governments, Guatemalans continued to suffer brutal human rights violations. For
example, when the war ended in 1996, the Peace Accords required Guatemala to reform
its justice system. However, the United Nations agency established to monitor
compliance with the peace accords (MINUGUA) reported continued impunity and the
persistent lack of due process. In its 2000 Special Report, MINUGUA concluded that
“[w]ith regard to the allegations of threats, harassment and intimidation of judges, the
Special Rapporteur finds that these concerns are real [and that t]he Government ha[s]
failed to provide the requisite protection or assistance to those who have complained.”9
In addition, “the large number of unsolved violent murders and the high incidence of
impediments to investigations and prosecutions in these murders and human rightsrelated crimes . . . should give an indication of the very high rate of impunity.”10 The
MINUGUA report in 2001 states that “[h]arassment and threats to justice operators
continue to be of serious concern [and that] rather than declining, these incidents have
actually increased.”11 This report finds that “impunity is still widespread.”12 In 2004,
Óscar Berger was sworn in as Guatemala‟s latest president. President Berger emphasized
improving Guatemala‟s human rights protections as a central feature of his campaign. As
we discuss below, the Berger administration has taken some steps to fulfill that promise.
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However, there are still monumental obstacles to improving human rights conditions and
to achieving justice for human rights violations.

3.

The Role of Courts
A.

Legal Accountability

In the face of the legacy of catastrophic political violence, victims frequently look
to the courts to reconstruct the rule of law and provide justice. According to many
human rights activists and scholars, courts must act to consolidate democratic reform
based upon the rule of law in post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings.13 As Fletcher
and Weinstein argue, “Accountability provides a direct, moral, and ethical response to
victims on behalf of society that demonstrates that the state is validating their innocence
and their lack of culpability in the deeds.”14 By punishing those responsible, the state
recognizes the suffering of the victims and issues a moral condemnation of the actions
committed.15 As Jamie Mayerfeld writes, punishment “communicates society‟s
condemnation of [the] violation, and helps actual and potential aggressors to absorb the
lesson that such violation is morally wrong.”16 Courts address the victims‟ desire for
retribution by punishing individual defendants and in so doing may also serve to protect
against future violations.17 Mayerfeld argues that, “the obligation to deter constitutes the
core rationale for punishing human rights violations.”18 Yet another scholar, Jennifer
Widner, points out that by punishing violators, courts can provide a credible threat that
future violations will be punished as well.19 In order to guarantee human rights in the
present, past threats to punish must be carried out.20
Indeed, according to Mayerfeld, effective judicial dispute resolution systems
“encourage social reconciliation by modeling a fair procedure for the just disposition of
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violent conflicts fueled by bitter political and ideological divisions.”21 Judicial action
against human rights violators may also prevent future abuses by reestablishing norms
such as respect for the rule of law and basic human rights.22 Ruti Teitel states that
“[w]hen criminal justice denounces these crimes, such prosecutions have a systemic
impact transcending the implicated individual . . . [and to] society, such trials express the
normative value of equality under the law, a threshold value in the transformation to
liberal democratic systems.”23 Teitel also argues that “establishing knowledge of past
actions committed under color of law and its public construction as wrongdoing is the
necessary threshold to prospective normative uses of the criminal law.”24 Martha Minow
agrees with this assertion as she writes, “To respond to mass atrocity with legal
prosecutions is to embrace the rule of law.”25 Human rights trials, according to Minow,
transform individual desires for vengeance to the state and this “transfer cools vengeance
into retribution, slows judgment with procedure and interrupts, with documents, crossexaminations and the presumption of innocence, the vicious cycle of blame and feud.”26

B.

Judicial Independence and Accountability

Scholars and activists frequently urge judicial independence and reform in order
to establish a domestic institution capable of holding government accountable to the rule
of law.27 The result, in theory, is an independent court system at home that can check
tyranny from the other political institutions. Judicial independence can be defined as the
extent to which the members of a court may adjudicate free from institutional controls,
incentives, and impediments imposed by other political institutions or forces.28 In
Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton states that “the courts were designed to be an
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intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order to, among other things,
to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”29 According to Hamilton,
the independence of the judiciary operates as a "safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humors in the society.”30 As Charles Epp states in his comparative study,
“the judicial system‟s structural independence . . . is widely recognized as a necessary
condition for any significant judicial check on arbitrary power.”31
Independence would seem to be especially important if courts are to hold
government officials accountable for past or on-going violations of human rights. In a
comparison of the U.S. and Canadian high courts, Miller discovered the U.S. Supreme
Court was more likely to challenge other branches because it possessed more autonomy
than its Canadian counterpart.32 Comparative scholars have consistently recognized the
importance of judicial independence in democratization, protecting individual rights and
promoting the rule of law.33 Dodson and Jackson linked the impotence of the judiciary
directly to human rights violations in Guatemala and El Salvador.34
Thomas Jefferson differed with Hamilton‟s view of judicial independence,
however, arguing that judges “should be submitted to some practical and impartial
control.”35 He observed that “[a]ll know the influence of interest on the mind of man,
and how unconsciously his judgment is warped by that influence.”36 Critics of absolute
judicial autonomy “object to what they consider to be an inordinate and constitutionally
unjustifiable grant of power to the branch of government which is least likely to
accurately represent the genuine will of the people.”37 For example, Mark Tushnet
argues that granting judges independence encourages them to follow their political will
and not necessarily their legal judgment.38 Michael Collins points out that an
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independent court “could itself engage in acts of constitutional usurpation that might be
difficult to remedy.”39
It is possible, then, that the traditional pillars of judicial independence could, in
some circumstances, impede human rights accountability. Ratner and Abrams argue that,
“Accountability cannot be isolated from the political dynamic in which competing
factions within states seek to manipulate the past in order to justify both their prior
activities and the current programs.”40 In repressive states, judges abetting tyranny could
continue to do so unencumbered by the constraints of democratic accountability.
Independence can only free courts from unwanted influence, it cannot grant judges the
will to confront decades of impunity, nor can it anoint them with the wisdom to overcome
legislatively or constitutionally rooted opposition to accountability. Judges will, after all,
always be bound to the political elite at least to some degree and as Ratner and Abrams
articulate, “the most critical reason for the lack of prosecutions…is that serious violations
of international human rights or humanitarian law are usually committed on behalf of or
with the complicity of the state.”41 In addition to judicial ties to state actors, the barriers
maintaining impunity include doctrines of sovereign immunity and amnesty laws, both of
which are raised and maintained by the state.
In new and unstable democracies the prosecution of human rights cases can
actually destabilize the democratic government and harm the cause of accountability.
Ratner and Abrams point out that “if a nation‟s leaders allow the prosecutions to become
a pawn in the competition for power, the trials will lack credibility and damage the
foundations of democracy.”42 These authors cite the Argentine experience, in which the
prosecution of human rights cases motivated the military “to challenge the young and
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insecure civilian government, thereby putting an end to the prosecutorial process.”
Similar dangers exist in Guatemala. On the other hand Ratner and Abrams recognize that
“outside actors – states, international organizations, and NGOs – can often help
strengthen regimes seeking accountability and defuse threats from the opponents of
prosecutions.”43
To summarize, judicial independence allows courts to provide some measure of
accountability for human rights violations. However, because domestic courts are part of
the state, they are constrained by state-constructed barriers. The level of accountability
they can provide, therefore, is severely limited. To overcome these barriers and to reach
greater levels of accountability victims must reach beyond the state. As I will
demonstrate further below, doing so not only affords victims with a forum beyond state
control, it can strengthen the independence of local judicial processes.

C.

Deep Wounds and Shallow Justice – Domestic Prosecutions in the Carpio,
Plan de Sanchez and Mack Cases

There is support for these assertions from the trenches of human rights litigation
in Guatemala. In the spring of 1993, politician, reform activist and newspaper-owner
Jorge Carpio Nicolle opposed the Serrano self-coup and the subsequent proposals to grant
amnesty to those who orchestrated the coup. Within a month of this outspoken
opposition, a state-sponsored civil patrol intercepted and murdered Carpio and several of
his associates.44 The families sought justice for the killings in Guatemala but Judge after
judge refused to hear the case. Guatemalan trial and appellate courts twisted the law to
block all efforts to hold accountable those responsible for the killings.45 Throughout the
more than ten years of investigation numerous crucial pieces of evidence have been lost,
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mislabeled and otherwise destroyed.46 Despite a report prepared by a chief prosecutor
implicating 11 members of a civil defense patrol in the murders only four of these men
were tried and only one was convicted of the crime. Moreover, this conviction came in
1996 after three years of dilatory tactics by the defense and by the trial courts. In an
additional blow, the trial court refused to consider the role of the civil defense patrol and
foreclosed any investigation of the intellectual authors of the attack. Then in 1998, in a
shocking ruling, the Guatemalan Court of Appeals absolved Patzan of any responsibility
for the murder and ordered his immediate release. The Court cited numerous evidentiary
irregularities, including the broken chain of custody of the alleged murder weapon. The
Guatemalan Supreme Court upheld this result and, while the investigation remains open,
no notable progress has occurred since that time.47
The result was an utter destruction of any belief in justice emanating from the
democratizing state. As the wife of one of the victims, Silvia Villacorta, testified before
the Inter-American Court, “Guatemala is a country of deep wounds and shallow justice”48
The wife of Jorge Carpio, Mrs. Arrivillaga de Carpio, recounted the utter failure of the
justice system in Guatemala and told the Inter-American Court that, as a result, she lived
each day in fear.49 “I felt unprotected,” she testified.50
The state obstructed all efforts to pursue truth and justice in the Plan de Sanchez
massacre case as well. During the period in which the massacre occurred, the military
was terrorizing the Mayan peasant countryside as part of its scorched earth
counterinsurgency campaign. These onslaughts came in the form of murders, violent
intimidation, displacement and the destruction of houses, farms, and livestock. Thus, in
the decade that followed the 1982 massacre the state was almost completely successful in

10

blocking attempts to investigate those responsible. One of the victims, Juan Manual
Jeronimo, testified, “The first years after the massacre we didn‟t do anything to seek
justice because we were not even allowed to talk about what happened never mind what
we wanted to do.”51 Finally, in 1993 victims represented by the Center for Human Rights
Legal Action (CALDH) brought charges. After exhumations and an investigation began
in 1994 the process quickly ran into state erected road blocks. Evidence, such as
ammunition cartridges and ballistics reports disappeared and exhumations slowed to a
stop. As one of the victims, Buenaventura Manuel Jerónimo, testified before the InterAmerican Court:
After a long time, a report of the incident was filed by the Center for Human
Rights Legal Action [In Guatemala]. Nevertheless, until today there has been
neither justice nor any results of that process. The violence, the corruption, and
the discrimination against the indigenous peoples and farmers impede justice.
Until this day there are still threats against any judge involved in the case.”52
On September 11, 1990, Myna Mack Chang, an anthropologist studying the
displacement of thousands of indigenous Guatemalans, was assassinated by members of a
military death squad. Authorities originally informed Myrna Mack‟s sister, Helen, that
Myrna perished in an auto accident. Skeptical of the claim, Helen eventually discovered
the true cause of her sister‟s death – she had been stabbed 27 times outside her Guatemala
City office. For Helen Mack, the path to justice has been an insufferable ordeal. The
state actively blocked her efforts to hold those responsible for the murder accountable
under Guatemalan law. As in the Carpio and Plan de Sanchez cases the mechanisms of
impunity were first deployed during the initial investigation. Investigators neglected to
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take fingerprints, photographs or blood samples from the crime scene. Although Myrna
Mack‟s clothing and fingernail samples were initially retained, they were discarded
before any laboratory analysis was conducted on them. A report drafted by investigators
suggesting that Guatemalan security forces planned and carried out the murder was
destroyed. When one of these investigators testified about this report he was
assassinated.53
In addition to legal and procedural obstructions those wishing to preserve
impunity launched a violent campaign against anyone working on the Mack case. In
April 1994 the president of Guatemala‟s Constitutional Court, Epaminondas González
Dubón, was shot and killed. At the time of the murder the Court was considering several
controversial human rights cases, including preliminary rulings on the Myrna Mack
case.54 Throughout the more than 10 years of judicial proceedings death threats have
driven more than ten judges to drop the case. Several judges, prosecutors and witnesses
have fled the country after receiving death threats. In July 1994, Helen Mack was forced
to leave Guatemala after a plan to murder her was exposed. The next month Roberto
Romero, a Myrna Mack Foundation lawyer, fled the country after assailants fired at
him.55 In an interview, an activist working in Guatemala reported that she has personal
knowledge of judges and prosecutors who suffer “harassment, threats . . . in a lot of cases
their families have been threatened, they‟re harassed, some of them have suffered attacks
and some have suffered pressure from within the system.”56

D.

The Need for International Court Involvement
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Both Governmental agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
monitoring the judiciary in Guatemala during and after the war have unanimously found
that Guatemala‟s courts not only failed to offer citizens adequate judicial remedies, but
actually aided human rights violations and perpetrated impunity. For example, The
Historical Clarification Commission for Guatemala concluded: “The justice system, nonexistent in large areas of the country before the armed confrontation, was further
weakened when the judicial branch submitted to the requirements of the dominant
national security model.” The Historical Clarification Commission went even further
finding that:
. . . by tolerating or participating directly in impunity, which concealed the
most fundamental violations of human rights, the judiciary became
functionally inoperative with respect to its role of protecting the individual
from the State, and lost all credibility as guarantor of an effective legal
system. This allowed impunity to become one of the most important
mechanisms for generating and maintaining a climate of terror.57
Even after the Peace Accords were signed in 1996 justice was simply not
available to human rights victims. Few cases were prosecuted and the intimidation of
complainants, judges, prosecutors, and witnesses obstructed the judicial process. With
the Mack, Carpio and Plan de Sanchez cases we see a fundamental justification for
international courts. When a domestic system so completely fails in its duty to uphold
the rule of law, it is incumbent on the international system to fill the void. According to
Teitel, international human rights “jurisprudence evinces the clear delimiting of state
power on the basis of individual rights norms.”58 Extra-national rulings against former
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officials shatter the view that these officials are immune from prosecution and inspire
local attempts to penetrate the shield of impunity. Prosecutions in international courts,
therefore, can send a powerful message to the legal and human rights communities in
post-conflict nations. Ratner and Abrams point out that international courts can “put
pressure on governments comply with their international obligations (including their
duties to prosecute offenders.”59 They also recognize that these institutions can
“establish an authoritative factual record” and “serve the cause of developing human
rights and humanitarian law.”60 Minow argues that when a crime against humanity is
“prosecuted outside the affected territory, in the absence of regime change, it is perhaps
the purest illustration of the potential of law to effect normative transition . . . [i]ndeed,
the very response to the crime against humanity instantiates its core value of transcendent
justice.”61 Extra-national convictions can aid local prosecutions by communicating legal
strategies and even precedent through the embracing of a broad concept of international
law. As Minow observes “[e]specially when framed in terms of universality, the
language of rights and the vision of trials following their violation equip people to call for
accountability even where it is not achievable.”62

4.

Cases Before the IACHR
A.

Introduction to the Inter-American System

The Organization of American States (OAS) established the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (Commission) in 1959 to monitor compliance with the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Then in 1965 the OAS gave the
Commission the power to hear individual human rights cases and recommend solutions.
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In 1969 the OAS recast its human rights principles by passing the American Convention
on Human Rights. The Convention not only sets out the basic human rights standards for
member states but it establishes the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). Of
the 35 OAS member nations 24 have accepted the binding jurisdiction of the IACHR.63
Guatemala signed the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights on May 25, 1978,
and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court on March 9, 1987.
Under the Convention the primary functions of the Commission are to consider
individual complaints and impose conciliatory remedies, to monitor human rights
compliance in the region, to conduct on site studies of human rights conditions and to
impose “precautionary measures” to prevent potential human rights violations. The
Commission has frequently involved itself in Guatemala‟s human rights affairs. For
example after an on site visit in 2001, the Commission concluded that:
. . . profound systemic deficiencies continue to subvert justice, and have
yet to be effectively addressed. These include serious problems in the
systems and procedures for delivering justice, as well as the paralyzing
effect of attempts to coerce those involved in the pursuit and
administration of justice through threats and corruption. Given the central
role of the judiciary in safeguarding all individual rights, the challenge of
redressing these problems is both urgent and paramount. 64
To pursue a human rights claim in the Inter-American system victims must first
file a complaint with the Commission. The Commission then seeks a response from the
nation alleged to have committed the violation. Once a response is received the
Commission must decide if the case is admissible – meaning within the Commission‟s
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jurisdiction. For the petition to be admissible it must allege violations of rights protected
by one of the several instruments recognized by the OAS and it must demonstrate that the
petitioners exhausted their domestic remedies.65 The Commission can hear complaints
against any member nation of the OAS.66
If the Commission determines a case is admissible it considers evidence presented
by each of the parties and frequently encourages a negotiated settlement. If negotiations
fail the Commission issues a ruling on culpability. If it finds the nation culpable, it issues
recommendations and prescribes remedies. These rulings are confidential at this stage
and designed to encourage violating nations to comply with the mandated human rights
instruments. If a nation fails to comply with the orders of the Commission, the
Commission brings the case before the IACHR. Here the Commission prosecutes the
case against the nation in question. Evidence is presented and a formal decision is issued
by the court that contains a ruling on culpability as well as remedies if appropriate. The
victims may be represented by counsel before the Commission and IACHR.

B.

The Carpio Case

With all efforts to pursue justice at home blocked, Carpio‟s wife, Martha
Arrivillaga de Carpio, and daughter-in-law, Karen Fischer, looked beyond Guatemala to
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. With the help of the Human Rights
Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala, the Center for Justice and International Law
(CEJIL), Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Law Group, these
women filed a petition with the Commission on July 12, 1994. Instead of pleading that
they had exhausted local remedies the Carpio petitioners argued that the state actively
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obstructed their attempts to seek justice domestically and that domestic remedies were
therefore unobtainable.67 The Commission agreed that justice in Guatemala had been
completely obstructed by the state.
The Commission typically makes the decision on admissibility at the outset – as it
did in the Plan de Sanchez case discussed below. However, if more information is
needed to make the determination – as it was in the Carpio case – the Commission can
reserve this decision until it has heard from the parties and considered the facts. At this
early stage the Commission sets out to find a conciliatory solution by receiving evidence
and negotiating with the parties. After doing so in the Carpio case, the Commission
finally ruled that the case was admissible. It then ordered Guatemala to investigate the
murders thoroughly in order punish those responsible for planning and carrying out the
attack.68 The Commission‟s order also included provisions recommending reparations
for the families of the victims.69 On June 10, 2003, when Guatemala failed to reply
within the time required, the Commission took the case to the Inter-American Court.70 It
alleged that Guatemala violated the victims‟ rights to life, personal integrity, judicial
protection, freedom of expression, and the rights of the child under the Inter-American
Convention. While the Commission prosecuted cases, recent changes in the IACHR‟s
rules allow the victims and survivors to be represented by counsel at the proceedings as
well. CEJIL represented the Carpio parties.71
As the Carpio hearing began on July 5 and 6, 2004, the president of the
Guatemalan Presidential Commission of Human Rights announced that his government
accepted Guatemala‟s international responsibility for the attack on Carpio and his
associates.72 Guatemala acknowledged that Mr. Carpio was murdered to chill opposition
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to the amnesty provisions. Because the state accepted responsibility, neither the
Commission nor CEJIL were required to prove the elements of each of the alleged
violations. However, CEJIL stressed the importance of allowing the victims and families
to tell their stories in open court and the state voiced no opposition to allowing them to do
so.73
The Court ruled that the state, acting through para-militaries, murdered Carpio for
political reasons and that it erected obstructions to justice resulting in “total impunity.”74
It went beyond a simple judgment that Carpio‟s rights were violated, and ruled that the
rights of all those threatened and attacked in their pursuit of justice in the case were also
violated.75 The reparations assigned by the Court in both cases reflect a desire to extend
beyond compensation and take steps to remedy conditions in Guatemala. For example, in
addition to money damages totaling $1,360,000 for the victims‟ families, the Court
ordered the state to enact concrete measures to prevent similar violations and continued
impunity.76

C.

The Plan de Sanchez Case

Blocked by the same infrastructure of impunity in Guatemala, the victims of the
Plan de Sanchez massacre filed their claim with the Inter-American Commission on May
11, 1999. As in the Carpio case, the petitioners argued and the Commission agreed that
local remedies were unobtainable due to the wall of impunity erected by the state.
CALDH represented the victims and families before the Commission and before the
IACHR.
In August, 2000, President Alfonso Portillo admitted “institutional responsibility”
for the Plan de Sanchez massacre during conciliation discussions between the state, the
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petitioners, and the Commission.77 On February 28, 2002, the Commission, after
analyzing the positions of both sides, made a series of recommendations to the state
including a demand that the state conduct an investigation to identify and sanction those
responsible for the massacre.78 The Commission also required Guatemala to pay both
material and nonmaterial compensation to the survivors of the massacre and to take
measures to ensure that such an atrocity would never recur. Despite Portillo‟s acceptance
of responsibility, Guatemala failed to take the steps required by the Commission.79
Therefore, the Commission presented the case before the IACHR on July 31,
2002. At this stage Commission lawyers took on new roles and prosecuted the case
against the state before the Inter-American Court. They alleged that the state of
Guatemala violated the rights to personal integrity, judicial protection, judicial guarantees,
equality before the law, property and freedom of religion embodied in Articles 5, 8, 25,
24, 12, 21, and 1.1 of the American Convention of Human Rights.80 In addition to
prosecuting the rights of those killed and wounded during the attacks and the rights of
those who suffered losses, the Commission alleged violations based on Guatemala‟s
resistance to truth and justice in the case.
The Plan de Sanchez hearing took place before the IACHR in San Jose, Costa
Rica, on April 23 and 24, 2004. In addition to depositions and affidavits, the Commission
and CALDH called family members of those killed in the massacre and experts on the
effects of the attack. After the Commission concluded its case, Guatemala announced
that it was retracting its exceptions to the complaint and accepting full international
responsibility for the massacre and subsequent violations.81 Doing so constituted
complete acceptance of the Commission‟s complaint and an admission that Guatemala
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committed the violations therein alleged. The Court accepted Guatemala‟s admissions
and shifted the proceeding to the reparations phase.82
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the Plan de Sanchez
victims were denied their rights to personal integrity, judicial protection, equality before
the law, freedom of religion, property.83 Moreover the state‟s efforts to preserve
impunity after the massacre violated the petitioners‟ rights to judicial protection.84 The
Court awarded $20,000 per beneficiary in pecuniary damages totaling almost $7
million.85 Moreover the Court ordered Guatemala to construct health care and mental
health facilities in the Plan de Sanchez community as well as road, water and sewer
systems.86

C.

The Myrna Mack Case

Immediately after Myrna Mack‟s murder Helen Mack approached the InterAmerican Commission. On Helen‟s behalf the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission
filed a complaint against Guatemala in the Commission on September 12, 1990. The
Commission reserved its determination of admissibility while it observed the domestic
process. However, on March 5, 1996, after seeing the ineffectiveness of the domestic
proceedings, the Commission ruled that the Mack case was admissible. At a hearing
before the Commission the state accepted institutional responsibility for the extra-judicial
killing of Myrna Mack. This step facilitated a compromise agreement on the remedies to
be prescribed. In this agreement, Guatemala promised to reinitiate the domestic case
against the alleged intellectual authors of the killing and to protect the integrity of those
proceedings.87
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The Inter-American Commission sent a delegation to Guatemala to ensure the
state complied with the agreement and in two separate reports the delegation found that
Guatemala failed to do so. In light of these findings, on March 8, 2001, the Commission
issued a decision finding Guatemala responsible for violating Myrna Mack‟s right to life,
and Helen Mack‟s right to justice. It assessed damages and required Guatemala to
investigate and prosecute those responsible for orchestrating the murder. In response
Guatemala revoked its admission of institutional responsibility. The Commission ruled
that Guatemala showed no indication that it would follow the Commission‟s
recommendations and filed the case in the IACHR on July 26, 2001. Guatemala objected,
arguing that neither the Commission nor the Court had jurisdiction because the domestic
prosecution was ongoing. The IACHR agreed with the Commission‟s ruling that the
domestic prosecution was a façade disrupted by obstructions orchestrated by the state.88
The IACHR heard the Mack case from February 18 – 20, 2003. CEJIL
represented the victims and along with the Commission they put on evidence of the
state‟s responsibility for the murder, the repeated state efforts to obstruct the domestic
proceedings and the tremendous toll Myrna Mack‟s death had upon the lives of her
family members. Myrna Mack‟s daughter, who was 16 years old when her mother was
killed, testified that she “thinks of her mother every day, especially of the way she was
murdered, of the pain of the 27 knife wounds she suffered, and of how she must have felt
lying alone on the street.”89
On November 25, 2003, the Court issued its judgment in which it ruled that the
Presidential General Staff had ordered Guatemalan security forces to murder Myrna
Mack and that this murder violated the right to life protected in the American
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Convention.90 The IACHR ruled that the murder was planned and executed for political
purposes as part of campaign to silence those who would expose Guatemalan human
rights violations.91 The Court also found that Guatemala had denied the Mack family the
right to justice by covering up the crime and obstructing the judicial process through legal
and violent means.92 Finally, the Court ruled that Guatemala violated the Mack family‟s
rights to humane treatment by committing the murder and by using threats and coercion
to impede the family‟s attempts to pursue justice.93 In addition to more than $600,000 in
pecuniary damages divide among three family members, the Court required Guatemala to
remove all obstacles to the domestic prosecution, to name a street after Myrna Mack and
to create a permanent anthropology scholarship in Myrna Mack‟s name.
These three cases present a typical formula for Guatemala. In each the state
orchestrated a brutal human rights violation. In each the state deployed a multifaceted
campaign to cover up the crime and obstruct all efforts to attain justice. And in each the
litigants reached beyond the state, to the Inter-American Court, to escape the Guatemalan
formula of injustice.

4.

The IACHR and Human Rights Accountability
A.

The Function of the IACHR

In their study of international courts, Posner and Yoo argue that the IACHR is
ineffective because it hears few cases and compliance rates are low.94 In their effort to
compare a wide variety of international courts, these authors necessarily simplify their
criteria for effectiveness by concentrating on the number of cases heard and the rate of
compliance. This assessment may not fully reflect the effectiveness of an institution like
the IACHR. For example, when comparing the IACHR to the European Court of Human
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Rights (ECHR), Posner and Yoo find the IACHR to be less effective. However, these
institutions are in completely different political universes, serving radically different
purposes. The ECHR is the pinnacle tribunal created and supported by predominantly
established democracies. While it considers cases from transitional democracies, some of
which are dealing with political violence, most of its rulings address nonviolent
violations. The ECHR, and European courts in general, have comparatively high levels
of legitimacy.95 Importantly, the European Union provides significant material incentives
to submit to and comply with the authority of the ECHR. In this environment the goal of
the ECHR is to constrain member states under the conventions – member states which for
the most part have established records of compliance with the rule of law. On the other
hand, the IACHR is an institution striving to solidify its institutional legitimacy in a sea
of new and developing democracies. Many of these democracies are experiencing or
emerging from drastic political violence. The cases before the IACHR often arise from
the political violence that preceded democratization or that is part of the transition
struggle. The purpose and setting of the IACHR is fundamentally different, therefore,
than that of the ECHR.
In this piece we focus our assessment on whether the IACHR improves human
rights conditions in the Americas, concentrating on one of the toughest challenges Guatemala. Drawing from the scholarship discussed above we identify four purposes of
an international court that hears human rights cases from post-conflict democracies. (See
Table 1). First, it should operate to deter future violations with rulings that “equip people
to call for accountability.”96 Second, it should facilitate the legal and moral
condemnation of human rights violations.97 Third, its jurisprudence should transcend the
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parties in the case in order to express the normative value of justice and equality under
the law to broad classes of victims.98 Fourth, it should establish “knowledge of past
actions committed under color of law” and create a historical record.99 An overview of
the IACHR‟s jurisprudence demonstrates that, given the tribunal‟s authority and
resources, it has had some success.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
B.

Facilitating Accountability – Equipping Victims to Seek Justice

There are numerous examples of the IACHR overriding state efforts to erect
institutional barriers to human rights accountability. In 2001, the IACHR ruled that
Peruvian amnesty laws protecting military personnel from prosecution for a 1991
massacre violated the American Convention on Human Rights.100 After this decision the
Peruvian government filed charges against security forces allegedly responsible for this
and other human rights crimes.101 In 1999, the IACHR ruled that El Salvador was
responsible for the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests and two others. In doing so, the
Court struck down El Salvador‟s amnesty law, holding that the state had unlawfully
denied citizens‟ the right to justice by granting amnesty to those convicted for the
murder.102 Pursuant to IACHR decisions, Chilean courts ruled that a 1978 amnesty law
could not supersede international law. Because Chile had signed the Inter-American
treaties prohibiting torture and other human rights violations, the amnesty law as applied
to these crimes violated Chile‟s international obligations.103 By circumventing these
barriers to accountability, the IACHR equips litigants with the legal tools to pursue
justice domestically. These rulings poke holes in the wall of impunity erected by the
state.
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The most illustrative example of this phenomenon in Guatemala may be the
Myrna Mack case – as the IACHR revived the case on at least two occasions. After
Myrna Mack was killed by security forces, prosecutors and the Myrna Mack Foundation
tried for more than ten years to convict the intellectual authors of the attack. Guatemala
had an interest in keeping the domestic case going in order to argue that domestic
remedies had not been exhausted and that the Commission case was inadmissible. Then
in March, 2000, faced with an imminent IACHR trial, the government offered to take
responsibility for the murder. The stalled domestic trial of the senior officers accused in
the case suddenly resumed and, armed with IACHR rulings, prosecutors won guilty
verdicts against two officers who planned the murder. In another set-back, however,
these verdicts were overturned on appeal. Once again the IACHR stepped in. In
December, 2003, the IACHR unanimously ruled that Guatemala had violated the right to
life and the right to judicial guarantees and protection. The tribunal ordered Guatemala to,
among other things, “remove all obstacles to justice in the case.”104 Just one month later
the Guatemalan Supreme Court reinstated the guilty verdicts against the officers who
orchestrated Myna Mack‟s murder.
It is clear from the Guatemala cases that the IACHR sees its role as a mechanism
to circumvent the systemic impunity in oppressive nations. Throughout the Carpio trial
IACHR judges asked witnesses and counsel what the Court could order to remedy
impunity, to push human rights cases through the Guatemalan courts and to prevent
future judicial stonewalling.105 For example, Judge Garcia Sayan asked several witnesses
“what ingredients might be necessary to conduct an effective investigation” in the Carpio
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case and in similar cases. Judge Jackman asked the lawyers in the case, “What formal
steps are needed to reopen the [Carpio] case on Guatemala?”106
Another way the IACHR helps advocates seek accountability is through the
publicity accompanying international cases. Human rights NGOs use the Inter-American
process to call attention to the mechanisms fostering impunity domestically. The
Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA) worked with the lawyers in the Mack
case to conduct a public relations campaign so that the case would have a significant
impact in Guatemala and globally. As Adrianna Beltran, the head of this campaign,
stated in an interview, “we used the Mack case as a way of highlighting the inefficiencies
of the judicial system.”107 The purpose of the media campaign, according to Ms. Beltran,
was to “illustrat[e] the impunity that the military enjoyed, the weaknesses and the failures
of the judicial system, the human rights situation and the fact that so many witnesses,
lawyers, judges were being threatened, harassed, murdered.”108 Based on the IACHR
case, this group orchestrated a campaign to use the case to bring pressure to bear on
Guatemala from members of the U.S. government. Ms. Beltran recalled that: “if the
[domestic] case was stalling – or if security was necessary – we would organize a
campaign involving „dear colleague‟ letters or remarks on the floor, [we] would then
circulate it to U.S. and International media.”109
As Pasqualucci (2003) observes, the Inter-American Court has liberally settled
several controversial questions of international human rights law thereby giving
advocates legal tools in their campaign for accountability.110 For example, the Court
rejects the contention that rights are “culturally relative” and instead holds them to be
universal.111 The IACHR fundamentally altered rights jurisprudence in the region when

26

it held that human rights law was part of international law but that unlike traditional
international law, it did not merely grant rights to states.112 Moreover, early in its history,
the IACHR held that international law obligated states and granted to individuals the
authority to hold states to compliance.113 In doing so, the Court struck down state efforts
to circumvent this obligation. According to Pasqualucci, the Court allowed fundamental
human rights to develop and expand over time. Instead of interpreting rights as they
existed when the Court was established, it considered rights within the legal framework at
the time of interpretation.114 Another crucial element of the Court‟s jurisprudence,
according to Pasqualucci, is that it has held that certain fundamental human rights are
non-derogable, even in times of emergency. The Court has refused to allow states to
reserve recognition of these fundamental rights.115
A CEJIL lawyer, Roxanna Altholz, observed in an interview that the Court is
increasingly recognizing impunity and failure to provide justice as distinct human rights
violations. Its remedies in the Guatemalan cases are direct attempts to address these
violations. IACHR rulings have mandated new and revived prosecutions, and even the
reinterpretation of amnesty and limitations laws. Along these lines, Ratner and Abrams
note generally that “Certain trends in the international legal process suggest these
somewhat vaguely worded provisions are evolving into obligations by states to take
specific action against offenders.”116 According to these scholars, “Among the most
significant developments” moving this trend, “was a 1988 decision of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, which interpreted the American Convention of Human Rights to
require states to investigate seriously, identify and punish offenders as well as
compensate victims.”117
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The Court also equips victims to seek justice by protecting their safety while they
are in litigation. This occurs directly and indirectly. In the direct approach, litigants can
ask the IACHR for “provisional measures” if they believe they are in danger or that
witnesses are being threatened.118 The Court will often issue these “provisional
measures” ordering, for example, the state to provide armed security to litigants. The
indirect element of safety that comes from litigating before the IACHR arises as a result
of the publicity surrounding these cases. Defendants are less likely to attack or threaten a
litigant if they are known internationally. NGOs working within the system foster this.
Adrianna Beltran, an activist with WOLA coordinated the public relations effort during
the Mack case. In an interview, she explained that “when [the Mack family‟s] lawyer
was receiving a number of threats - right before the case actually went to trial – [Helen]
called me and said we‟re receiving threats and everybody was on the phone with the state
department, with the embassy, with members of congress or their staff, saying please call
and tell them that you‟re really concerned.”119 In this effort, Ms. Beltran observed, “we
were sending the message that she was not alone.”120

C.

Condemning Human Rights Violations

For more than 20 years Guatemala blocked all attempts to punish those
responsible for the Plan de Sanchez massacre of 268 Mayan Guatemalans (see above).
Then in 2004, the IACHR ruled that Guatemala was responsible not only for the
massacre but for denying justice to the victims and families for these many years. In
addition to financial compensation, Guatemala was ordered to conduct a public apology.
On July 18, 2005, exactly 23 years after the massacre, Guatemalan Vice President
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Eduardo Stein traveled to Plan de Sanchez to formally apologize for the killings before
the families and survivors of the victims. In his remarks, Stein conceded that the army
had “unleashed bloodshed and fire to wipe out an entire community.”121 He observed
that the “people want moments that commemorate their victims, but more than anything,
they don't want what happened to keep being denied officially.”122
The IACHR recognizes the significance of its rulings as the sole voice of justice
after years of impunity. In its judgments, therefore, the IACHR goes beyond traditional
reparations and includes provisions to amplify the impact of its decisions. Often this
takes the form of a mandated, public apology such as the event described above. In one
of his first official acts as President, Oscar Berger publicly apologized for the murder of
Myrna Mack pursuant to an IACHR demand. President Berger apologized to Myrna
Mack‟s sister and daughter and to the Guatemalan people in a ceremony broadcast on
national television and held in front of the military and other dignitaries.
As the IACHR hearing began in the Carpio case, the president of the Guatemalan
Human Rights Commission asked to address the Court. He stood, faced the families of
the victims, admitted that the state was responsible for the murder of Carpio and his
associates, and asked for forgiveness. When each family member testified, counsel for
the state opened his remarks by apologizing for the state‟s actions.123 Soraya Long, the
CEJIL lawyer representing the families, commented in an interview that “It is extremely
important that the state has recognized its responsibility – this is a very significant step –
it is a very important gesture that the state asked for pardon from the victims.”124 Ms.
Long explained “For more than ten years the families of the victims have said the murder
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of my husband, my father, was political – and the state said no, no … and now finally
they have said you were right, you were right.”

D.

Addressing a Broad Class of Victims with Individual Cases

A primary critique of the IACHR levied by Posner and Yoo is that the Court
resolves very few cases. While this critique certainly has merit and the IACHR would
have a broader effect if it decided more cases, it is a somewhat misleading measure by
which to assess this Court. The IACHR must, after all, preserve its precarious legitimacy
in a political sea with currents often hostile to judicial review. If the IACHR were to
review large numbers of human rights cases, while many national judiciaries in the region
are struggling, support for the institution would almost certainly be withdrawn. Instead
the IACHR, and the parties that litigate in the Inter-American system, seek to make the
most of the limited resources available to them. For the most part litigants pursue, and
the Court decides, cases that reflect a widespread human rights violation or that have
symbolic importance to the nation and region.
NGOs operating in the Inter-American system seek out cases and victims whose
injuries reflect wounds carried by a broader class of victims. CEJIL represents the
victims and survivors in most cases heard before the IACHR. Roxanna Altholz, the
CEJIL lawyer who served as lead counsel in the Myrna Mack case, explained that the
organization seeks cases that are “emblematic of a wider set of violations.”125 And
certainly the Myrna Mack case carried this weight. When Myrna Mack was murdered, on
September 11, 1990, she was studying the displacement of thousands of indigenous
Guatemalans. As an anthropologist with international notoriety, Mack‟s findings were
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embarrassing to those in power, many of whom were complicit in the disappearances.
The case, therefore, is symbolic of several of the deepest wounds inflicted during the 30year civil war. Because of Myrna Mack‟s work, the case symbolized the effort to reveal
the truth about the thousands of Mayan Guatemalans killed during the war. Also,
because the state made every effort to block justice in the case, the result was a victory
over the rampant impunity plaguing Guatemala. Myrna Mack‟s sister Helen testified
before the IACHR that the “case is a paradigmatic one not only for her family but also for
many Guatemalans who see themselves reflected in it” and that by litigating it she was
“representing, with dignity, the thousands of victims who had no chance.”126
The Plan de Sanchez case clearly had these broad implications. During the civil
war the Guatemalan military and civil patrols frequently attacked Mayan villages –
murdering and disappearing thousands of indigenous Guatemalans. The Plan de Sanchez
massacre, therefore, represented one of the most common and most horrific practices of
the repressive regimes. As one of the victims testified before the IACHR, “During the 15
years after the death of our loved ones, there has been repression on the part of the
authorities in the area – they try to stop us from performing our cultural practices and or
from celebrating our religious ceremonies.”127 Representatives and victims have been
attempting to hold accountable the powerful figures responsible for these killings for
more than twenty years.
Similar cases benefit from the Plan de Sanchez IACHR litigation. For example
the Tuluché massacre case involves indigenous villagers who were also labeled as
subversives during the civil war and were extra-judicially executed. Attempts to hold
accountable those who planned and participated in the massacre were repeatedly blocked
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by the infrastructure of impunity entrenched in the Guatemalan judicial system.128 Much
like Plan de Sanchez, the Tuluché case in Guatemala was plagued by death threats, the
dismissal of important evidence, as well as arbitrary acquittals of those accused. The
results of the Plan de Sanchez case in the IACHR, and other cases like it, have the ability
to bring justice for Mayans by creating a domino effect of legal accountability for
thousands accused of similar human rights violations in Guatemala.
As discussed above the Court required public apologies not only to the victims
and their families but to the affected communities and the Guatemalan people. In the
Plan de Sanchez case the Court further demonstrated the importance of public
recognition in that it ordered the state to publicize key sections of the Court‟s judgments
in its official gazette and in a major national newspaper in both Spanish language and
Achi Maya.129 The Court ordered the state to enact efforts to support the growth and
welfare of the Maya in the Plan de Sanchez Municipality with measures to promote the
Achi Maya language and Culture.130
The Carpio case had similarly broad implications. Jorge Carpio Nicolle was
murdered because of his opposition to an amnesty provision that would have prevented
legal accountability for thousands accused of human rights violations. He was a reform
activist and a journalist who frequently spoke out against the Guatemalan military state
and efforts to preserve impunity. His wife, Martha Arrivillaga de Carpio, testified during
the trial before the IACHR that the Carpio case was “emblematic of the injustice in
Guatemala.”131
Indeed it was clear that the IACHR realized these implications in handling these
cases. Instead of merely awarding reparations the Court frequently requires the state take
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concrete steps to address the broad class of victims not included in the case. It sets out to
attack broad problems through individual cases. CEJIL lawyer, Soraya Long, argued in
an interview that “the court uses its judgments to break systemic and structural failings
and solve the macro problems” facing nations under its jurisdiction.132
In the Carpio case, the Court also assessed remedies designed to address
weaknesses in Guatemala. For example, in addition to traditional compensatory damages,
the Court ordered the state to take concrete steps to prevent similar violations.133 In its
ruling, the Court targeted the widespread, systematic impunity ordering a full
investigation to identify and punish those responsible for planning and carrying out the
attack and the subsequent obstruction of justice.134 For example, the Court ordered the
state to remove all “obstacles and mechanisms … that maintain impunity” and to provide
security for all witnesses, judges and prosecutors.135 According to the order all
information discovered in the investigation must be made public because the victims,
their families and the Guatemalan people, the Court stressed, have “a right to the
truth.”136 The Court stretched its authority even further and ruled that to the extent
legislation may have granted the attackers amnesty, it is invalid because such laws violate
the victims‟ rights to justice and the truth.137

E.

Creating an Historical Record

Recognizing the victims‟ story and enshrining it in the judicial record are essential
parts of achieving justice for human rights violations.138 In these cases, the state denied
responsibility and obstructed any effort to find the truth. To the victims, therefore, the
official recognition of the truth is invaluable. In its judgment in the Myrna Mack case the
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IACHR ordered Guatemala to publicize a full account of its violations because “This
right to the truth … constitutes an important means of reparation.”139
When the Myrna Mack case reached the IACHR, Guatemala offered to accept
responsibility for the killing but the state was not willing to allow witnesses to testify.140
CEJIL‟s Roxanna Altholz, the lead counsel representing the Mack family, opposed
Guatemala‟s offer. In an interview Ms. Altholz stated that they refused Guatemala‟s
offer because “we didn‟t want a sentence that just recognized responsibility and went on
to reparations.”141 She pointed out that “we wanted, and it was very important for
[Myrna Mack‟s sister] Helen, to have all these pages of hechos probados [proven
facts].”142 More than that, Ms. Altholz stated, “what was so important for us was to have
the hechos probados include an indication that the state security forces were responsible
– that was fundamental for us.”143 Not only did the IACHR include in its decision an
exhaustive account of these hechos probados but it ordered Guatemala to publish them in
the “official gazette” and another daily newspaper with national circulation.144 In all its
cases CEJIL stresses the importance of allowing the victims and families to tell their
stories in open court. Roxanna Altholz pointed out that allowing victims an opportunity
to create a historical record and to express their suffering is an essential element of
seeking justice. She stated that, “the more you can let the victims‟ voices come through
the better your litigation is – the legal theories ring truer, your case is stronger.”145
This interest can be seen in the Carpio case as well. Even after Guatemala
accepted responsibility for the violations, CEJIL lawyers encouraged their witnesses – the
families of the victims – to testify extensively on their experiences, their suffering, and
their loss. CEJIL lawyers asked the court to “establish that the attack was a politically
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motivated execution.”146 They asked the court to set out an official version of the truth
by determining the specific acts and omissions that amounted to violations of the
Convention and by assigning institutional responsibility.147 The representative of the
state did not object to allowing this testimony, “recognize[ing] the right of the victims to
testify and tell their truth.”148 The victims‟ counsel, Soraya Long, pointed out in an
interview that for “the Carpio family … it was very significant to come here to [the InterAmerican Court] because with the internal proceeding they felt thwarted… and to come
to this court and say what occurred, to establish a record and to demonstrate that they had
overcome.”149
Never has the importance of creating an historical record been more evident than
in the Plan de Sanchez case. The IACHR recognized the injury inflicted by the state‟s
repeated denials and obstruction. It held that “the impunity in this case keeps the
memory of these acts fresh and impedes social reconciliation.”150 An expert on the rights
of indigenous peoples, Augusto Willemsen-Diaz, testified that “[t]o end the
discrimination and racism of the indigenous people in Guatemala I recommend that the
most important things are the acknowledgment of what occurred and that the people take
notice of the enormous amount of abuses that have occurred.”151 The anguish in the
victims‟ stories was memorialized in the Court‟s opinion. In the testimony of a family
member, Juan Manuel Jerónimo he says “the following day the bodies of our loved ones
were still decomposing when the military commissioners from Chipuerta arrived… They
did the most savage of burials and we were no longer able to recognize our relatives.”152
The decision also included testimony regarding the impunity entrenched in the
Guatemalan legal system. Another family member, Buenaventura Manuel Jerónimo,
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stated that “the violence, the corruption, and the discrimination against the Indigenous
peoples and farmers impeded justice.” He continued, “Until this day there are threats
against the judges” who hear these cases against the state.”153

Through this testimony in

front of the IACHR Guatemala‟s violent past and present were finally given a voice.
The IACHR is effective in setting out these histories. In its decisions the hechos
probados sections are extensive memorializing the victims‟ stories, the violations and the
impunity. For example, in the Carpio case, the IACHR including an account of Mr.
Carpio‟s work for Guatemalan democracy through his government service, political
activism and leadership of the newspaper “El Grafico.”154 CEJIL‟s Soraya Long stressed
the importance of establishing a historical record. She commented in an interview that
“Carpio‟s work exists in the fabric of Guatemala – in acts of the assembly, in articles of
the constitution – his family demands that their father – their husband – be included in the
history of his country.”155

5.

Conclusions – Impact of the Inter-American Court
Our analysis demonstrates that the Inter-American Court is a valuable factor

promoting human rights accountability and reconciliation in Latin America. (See Table
1). It is a powerful voice of accountability in a region struggling to fully democratize.
By holding states accountable it demonstrates to citizens that overcoming impunity is
possible. The Court‟s jurisprudence thus, to use Teitel‟s language, “evinces the clear
delimiting of state power on the basis of individual rights norms.”156 Lawyers, judges
and activists then seek human rights protections in domestic institutions armed with the
principles of law established by the Court. This positive impact is accentuated when the
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activists pursue, and the Court hears, cases that are emblematic of broader human rights
problems. Finally, in each case the Court enshrines the victims‟ stories of suffering into
an historical record. After years of official denial, the Inter-American Court represents
an official acceptance of the truth.
There are several critiques that may be levied at the Inter-American system.
Posner and Yoo correctly point out that the IACHR hears very few cases and that
compliance rates are questionable.157 Rescia and Seitles argue that the delay in
processing cases, along with procedural deficiencies and normative problems, are
significant failings of the system.158 One can see support for this in the Carpio case –
which was filed in 1994 and resolved in 2004. Indeed these critiques have some merit
and this essay is not intended to refute them. On the contrary, we conclude that even
with these weaknesses the IACHR is still indispensable in aiding reconciliation and
democratization for the post-conflict democracies in Latin America. The system would
be even more effective if it addressed many of the concerns voiced by critics.
In post-conflict democracies, domestic courts struggle for legitimacy, resources
and a meaningful role in their state‟s political discourse. However, as arms of the state
they often share the state‟s interest in quieting efforts to uncover past atrocities.
Moreover, they are frequently subject to influence from the other political powers.159
When litigants are able to reach beyond the state for justice, they escape this institutional
deck heavily stacked against them.
Human rights observers often note the effect of the IACHR‟s work. For example,
in its 2005 Report, Human Rights Watch observed that the “Inter-American human rights
system has provided an important venue for human rights advocates seeking to press the
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state to accept responsibility for abuses.”160 Similarly, after the Carpio, Mack and Plan
de Sanchez cases, Amnesty International recognized that, although Guatemala is still
suffering serious human rights violations, it has achieved “minor progress in trying past
cases of genocide or crimes against humanity.”161 Moreover, Amnesty International
pointed out that after these cases the Berger administration “took some positive measures
including modernization of the army and establishing a National Reparations
Commission.”162 Similar effects can be seen in other nations appearing before the Court.
For example, Helio Bicudo credits the Court‟s rulings with helping Peru restore
democracy and the integrity of its judiciary after President Fujimori‟s attempt to
circumvent constitutional constraints.163
During the Carpio hearing, Silvia Villacorta, the wife of one of the victims, told
the Court that “in Guatemala there is no justice so we must look to international justice.”
“We want,” she told the judges, “a precedent that future generations can look to.”164
While the institutions and procedures of the Inter-American Court need strengthening, it
is a positive – and necessary – force for human rights accountability on the region. It
offers victims like Silvia Villacorta the justice she deserved.
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Table 1 Standard for Assessing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Purpose of International Court
Source
Contribution of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights

Facilitating Accountability – Equipping
Victims to Seek Justice

Minow
Roht-Arriaza

Circumventing institutional barriers to
accountability
Innovating international human rights law
Protecting litigants, victims and witnesses

Condemning Human Rights Violations

Minow
Mayerfeld
Widner
Roht-Arriaza

Holding states accountable for violations
Communicating societal condemnation of the
violations.
Upholding the rule of law

Addressing a Broad Class of Victims
with Individual Cases

Teitel
Minow

Hearing cases that are emblematic of
widespread violations.
Tailoring remedies to address systemic
problems
Issuing sanctions to aid broad class of victims

Establishing an Historical Record

Teitel
Minow
Ratner and Abrams

Allowing victims to testify often for the first
time
Recording events based on evidence
Overcoming state denials and obfuscations
Enshrining the truth in the Court‟s judgments
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